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RECENT ABORTION
LITIGATION
MARTIN F. MCKERNAN, JR.*
W ITHIN THE PAST TWO YEARS there have been a number of chal-
lenges posed in the courts-both directly and sometimes inad-
vertently-to laws which allow for the performance of an abortion only
to save the life (and in some cases the health) of the expectant mother.
The first significant decision in this series was that of the California
Supreme Court in People v. Belous.1 This case involved the criminal
conviction of a California physician, Leon Belous, for conspiracy to
commit abortion by his recommendation of a patient to another doctor
for the performance of such an operation. The court, in a 4-3 decision,
found that the statute which proscribed abortion unless "necessary to
preserve her (the expectant mother's) life ' 2 was unconstitutionally
vague and reversed the conviction. The majority opinion noted that the
statute was not "susceptible of a construction that does not violate
legislative intent and that is sufficiently certain to satisfy due process
requirements without improperly infringing on fundamental constitu-
tional rights."'3 The United States Supreme Court dismissed the State's
appeal; and it is not unreasonable to assume that this denial was based
upon the fact that the question had been mooted since California had
adopted a new abortion law. 4
*Consultant to the National Right of Life Committee.
1 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
915 (1970). For an excellent discussion of this decision, see, McGrew, To Be or
Not To Be: The Constitutional Question of the California Abortion Law, 118 U.
PA. L. REV. 643 (1970).
2 Ch. 528, § 1 CAL. STAT. 1605 (1935), as amended, CAL. PENAL CODE § 274
(Deering 1960).
3 71 Cal. 2d at 960, 458 P.2d at 197, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
4 CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE §§ 25950-54. Abortion is permitted under this
law if continuation of the pregnancy would gravely impair the physical or mental
health of the expectant mother, if the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest or
if the expectant mother is under fifteen years of age.
1
(This new California statute, inciden-
tally, does not go to the same lengths as
that proposed in the Model Penal Code
of the American Law Institute, which
would also allow such operations when
two licensed physicians believe that the
child would be born with either serious
mental or physical defects. 5 Since its orig-
inal proposal the Code has been consid-
ered, at some level, by the legislatures of
all fifty states. To date, twelve states0 have
adopted its major provisions with certain
minor alterations, with California eliminat-
ing that section which allows for eugenic
abortions. Four other states7 now permit
the performance of an abortion simply
upon the request of the expectant mother,
with one of these jurisdictions8 allowing
such operations up until the twenty-fourth
week of the pregnancy.)
Shortly after the Belous decision a
United States District Court judge in Wash-
ington, D.C. ruled that the District of
Columbia abortion law was also imper-
missibly vague. 9 This statute allows for the
performance of such an operation when
either the life or health of the expectant
mother is threatened by continuation of
5 MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3(2), (3), (Pro-
posed Official Draft, 1962). For a discussion of
this portion of the Code, see Giannella, The
Difficult Quest for a Truly Humane Abortion
Law, 13 VILL. L. REV. 257 (1968).
6 Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware,
Georgia, Kansas, Maryland, New Mexico, North
Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina and Virginia.
7 Alaska, Hawaii, New York and Washington.
8 New York.
9 United States v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032
(D.D.C. 1969), prob. juris. noted, 397 U.S.
1061 (1970).
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the pregnancy. 10 The Supreme Court has
assumed probable jurisdiction in the appeal
of this decision by the Government and
oral arguments have been completed. The
indictment had been dismissed upon al-
leged vagueness grounds in this case, how-
ever, on a motion for summary judgment
prior to trial. The Court could thus re-
mand the case in order to establish some
record by which it could determine whether
the statute was actually vague as applied
to, and viewed and interpreted by, the
particular defendant.
Some recent decisions have moved from
the tangential issue of vagueness to discuss
the substantive-and more basic--ques-
tions which are involved in the entire area
of the alleged right of expectant mothers
to abort unwanted children and the pos-
sible right of these children to continued
existence. One such decision involved a
Milwaukee physician under prosecution
for violating the Wisconsin abortion law
which proscribes such operations unless
"necessary to save the life of the mother.""
Following his arrest for alleged violation
of the statute, Dr. Sidney Babbitz instituted
proceedings before a three-judge federal
court pursuant to appropriate federal stat-
utes. 12 He sought a declaratory judgment
that the law was violative of his First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights and that it
was also violative of the expectant mother's
right of privacy; and he requested enjoin-
ment of further prosecution under it.
10 67 STAT. 93, ch. 159, § 203; D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 22-201.
11 WIS. STAT. § 940.04.
12 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 2201, 2202; 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.
RECENT ABORTION LITIGATION
In its decision' 3 the three-judge court
considered the contention of vagueness in
light of the Belous and Vuitch cases; but
found that the Wisconsin Legislature had
been neither vague nor indefinite in its
choice of language, which was substantially
similar to that found in both the California
and District of Columbia statutes. This
court noted that the statute met the require-
ment enunciated by the Supreme Court in
193014 when it stated that:
Whenever the law draws a line there will
be cases very near each other on opposite
sides. The precise course of the line may
be uncertain, but no one can come near it
without knowing that he does so, if he
thinks, and if he does so it is familiar to
the criminal law to make him take the
risk.15
However, citing a series of Supreme
Court cases establishing, under the right of
privacy, such things as the right to marry
and raise children,' 6 the right to marry
unhampered by statutory racial restric-
tions,17 and the right to the acquisition of
information on contraceptives, i s this three-
judge court found that the same right of
privacy extended to the expectant mother
so that the state could not decree that she
must carry an unborn child prior to quick-
ening.
The Babbitz decision is difficult to un-
derstand for a number of reasons. In 1803
13 Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D.
Wis. 1970).
14 United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396
(1930).
15 Id. at 399.
16 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
IT Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
18 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
the first English statute dealing with abor-
tion was enacted. 0 This law did away with
the requirement enunciated by Coke and
by Blackstone that the fetus must have
quickened before an abortion could be
viewed as a felony. The necessity of quick-
ening was possibly abandoned because
advances in scientific thought were indicat-
ing that the developing life within the womb
took on some form and viability prior to
that which the law had previously assumed.
In 1837 another English statute20 further
amended the laws dealing with abortion
and eliminated completely any reference to
quickening, which had been retained to
determine the degree of punishment to be
meted out to one convicted of an abortion.
While the original Wisconsin statute deal-
ing with abortions retained the prescription
that quickening have occurred before
punishment could be imposed, this provi-
sion was eliminated in 1858. It is indeed
strange that this three-judge federal court
would revert to a standard long discarded
in the vast majority of common law juris-
dictions both in the United States and else-
where.
21
19 "Miscarriage of Women Act," 43 Geo. III,
c. 58 (1803).
20 "Offenses Against the Person Act," 7 Will. IV,
and 1 Vict., c. 85 (1837).
21 This decision also apparently stands in direct
contradiction to basic probate laws governing
the appointment of a guardian for unborn chil-
dren. It is also questionable in light of dictum
expressed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in
Puhl v. Wisconsin Auto Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 343,
99 N.W.2d 163 (1959) in which it was clearly
indicated that the law in Wisconsin will protect
the unborn child, in tort law, from the moment
of conception. There are, of course, no logical
legal protections to rationally be accorded the un-
born child if his mother can destroy him at will.
In this area see generally Note, The Law and
While the court-in a declaratory judg-
ment-did find the statute to be uncon-
stitutional, it nonetheless refused to grant
injunctive relief against its enforcement.
Thereupon the Milwaukee District Attor-
ney proceeded with his criminal prosecu-
tion of Dr. Babbitz. The doctor then
returned to the same judges, and upon his
second request was granted injunctive re-
lief. Upon an appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
this injunction was upheld and the matter
is now on appeal to the United States Su-
preme Court. However, a series of very
recent Supreme Court decisions could
vitally affect both the declaratory judgment
provision of the three-judge court's original
ruling and especially its later injunction.
These decisions will be discussed later.
Other Federal Court Decisions
Following a 1965 United States Su-
preme Court decision 22 the popularity
of specially-convened three-judge federal
courts increased rapidly. The number of
cases heard by such courts has almost
doubled since this decision-from 147 in
1965 to 291 in 1970.23 Accounting for at
least some of this new-found popularity
has been a series of cases before these
panels challenging state abortion statutes.
In addition to the court in the Babbitz
the Unborn Child: The Legal and Logical In-
consistencies, 46 NOTRE DAME LAw. 349 (1971);
Noonan, The Constitutionality of the Regula-
tion of Abortion, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 51 (1969);
Gordon, The Unborn Plaintiff, 6 MICH. L. REV.
579 (1965).
22 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
23 The Constitution and the Courts, THE WALL
ST. 1., March 2, 1971, at 16, col. 2.
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decision three other such panels have ruled
abortion statutes to be unconstitutional on
various grounds. One such court had be-
fore it the Texas law, which proscribes
abortions unless performed ". . . for the
purpose of saving the life of the mother. '24
The panel found that the law interfered
with the constitutionally-protected right to
decide whether to have children as enun-
ciated by the Supreme Court,2 5 and ruled
that no compelling state interest had been
demonstrated which would give the gov-
ernment the authority to forbid the exercise
of this right through the utilization of abor-
tion.26 While the panel did observe that the
state might well have the right to regulate
abortions, it said that this particular statute
under which it attempted to exercise the
right was void for overbreadth in that it
did not limit its application to whatever
compelling state interest, if any, might exist.
The court, however, on general grounds
of federal abstention, refused to grant the
injunctive relief against enforcement of the
statute which the plaintiffs had requested.
The plaintiffs have appealed the denial of
the injunction to the United States Supreme
Court. However, the Court has not as-
sumed jurisdiction. The State has appealed
the declaratory judgment portion of the
decision to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit; but action by
the Circuit Court has been stayed pending
the outcome of the proceeding before the
Supreme Court.
Another three-judge federal court found
24 TEX. PEN. CODE, art. 1196.
25 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
26 Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex.
1970).
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the Georgia abortion statute, 27 fashioned
along the lines of that proposed in the
Model Penal Code of the American Law
Institute,28 also to be unconstitutional on
the ground that the constitutionally-pro-
tected right of privacy included the right
to abort an unwanted pregnancy. In what
is an extremely confusing decision, 29 the
court then went on to observe, however,
that the decision to abort was not a purely
private one on the part of the expectant
mother, even in consultation with her hus-
band; and noted that the state had certain
interests in legislating in this area but found
fault with the statute under consideration
in that it limited the number of reasons for
which an abortion may be sought. The
panel denied the injunctive relief which
had been requested by the plaintiffs in
their original challenge to the statute and
the entire matter is now on cross-appeals
to the Supreme Court with protective ap-
peals having been filed in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
One three-judge federal court has
granted injunctive relief against enforce-
ment of a state abortion statute at the
same time it issued a declaratory judgment
that the law was unconstitutional. 30 The
panel found that the Illinois statute was
impermissibly vague and ruled that it un-
duly infringed upon the right of an ex-
pectant mother to decide whether she
wanted children (as applied to pregnancies
within the first trimester of the term).
27 GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1101 et seq.
28 See note 5 supra.
29 Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ga.
1970).
30 Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385 (N.D. Il1.
1971).
What is most interesting in regard to this
decision is that an immediate appeal of the
injunctive provision to Justice Thurgood
Marshall, the Circuit Justice for the Sev-
enth Circuit, brought an order of vacation
of the injunction. The entire decision will
now be cross-appealed by both parties to
the suit-one side seeking to have the de-
claratory judgment provision reversed and
the other seeking to have that portion up-
held and the injunction reinstated.
A number of other three-judge federal
courts have upheld state statutes restrict-
ing the performance of abortion specifically
to those situations where the life of the
expectant mother is at stake. One such de-
cision31 had under consideration the Loui-
siana statute which forbade an abortion
unless ". . . done for the relief of a woman
whose life appears in peril .... -32 On the
issue of vagueness, the panel agreed with
the Babbitz decision and said that the
statute provided meaningful guidance to
physicians. The court noted that little or
no importance has been attached to what-
ever rights may be possessed by the un-
born child and drew a sharp distinction
between the right to decide whether or not
to bear children as enunciated by the Su-
preme Court33 and the right to destroy
those children who have been conceived
but who are not yet born. Closely examin-
ing a large amount of medical evidence, the
court ruled that the State of Louisiana had
not been overreaching in assigning a cer-
tain amount of legal status to the unborn
31 Rosen v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical
Examiners, 318 F. Supp. 1217 (E.D. La. 1970).
32 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:1285 et seq.
33 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
infant. The court concluded on the note
that for federal panels to summarily strike
down state statutes, which have been given
consideration by the Legislature, is to de-
bilitate popular government.
In another decision34 a three-judge fed-
eral court, in considering the constitu-
tionality of the Ohio abortion law3 5 on
possible vagueness grounds, observed that
the problem was not that those who sought
to have the statute declared invalid did
not understand the law, but that basically
they did not accept its provisions. This
panel also drew a sharp distinction be-
tween the right to decide not to bear chil-
dren and the right to destroy an unborn
child. It said that to attempt to bring this
latter "right" under the aegis of the Gris-
wold decision was a refusal to recognize
the prohibition of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments against depriving anyone of
"life... without due process of law." This
recognition of constitutional protection
granted to unborn children was upheld by
the court in its examination of biological
evidence; and also in its examination of
those rights which the law has traditionally
accorded a child en ventre sa mere.
Another recent decision3 6 involved the
North Carolina abortion law37 which was
patterned along the provisions of the Model
Penal Code proposed by the American Law
34 Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741 (N.D.
Ohio 1970). See also Wagner v. Finch, 413 F.2d
267 (5th Cir. 1969); Oaks, Abortion and Due
Process, 23 REs IPSA LOQUITUR 5 (1970).
35 OHio REV. CODE § 2901.16.
36 Corkey v. Edwards, - F. Supp.
(W.D.N.C. 1971).
37 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45 et seq. (1969).
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Institute. 38 The court said that the issue
under consideration was whether the state
could constitutionally assign to the human
organism in its early prenatal development
the right to be born within certain strictly
prescribed exceptions; and then answered
its own question in the affirmative. The
panel went on to draw a sharp distinction
between the right not to have children3 9
and the claimed freedom to exercise this
right through abortion. In analyzing the
total question it observed that:
To determine the state interest we shall not
attempt to choose between extreme posi-
tions. Whether possessing a soul from the
moment of conception or mere protoplasm,
the fertilized egg is, we think, 'unique as a
physical entity'; with the potential to be-
come a person. Whatever that entity is,
the state has chosen to protect its very
existence. The state's power to protect chil-
dren is a well-established constitutional
maxim. That this power should be used to
protect a fertilized egg or embryo or fetus
during the period of gestation embodies no
logical infirmity, but would seemingly fall
within the 'plenary power of government.'
That there is a state interest has until
recently been taken for granted. History
sides with the state. 40
Federal Abstention
Two three-judge federal courts, con-
vened to consider the constitutionality of
abortion statutes in Missouri and Minne-
sota, dismissed the cases on the primary
basis of federal abstention.
In the Minnesota4 ' decision one plain-
38 See note 5 supra.
39 Griswold v. Connecticut, supra at 18.
40 Corkey v. Edwards, supra at -.
41 Doe v. Randall, 314 F. Supp. 32 (D. Minn.
1970).
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tiff, a doctor, had performed an abortion
upon one of the other plaintiffs. The doc-
tor sought an injunction against prosecu-
tion even though none had been initiated;
and also sought a declaratory judgment
that the State's statute was unconstitutional
on various grounds. The court ruled flatly
that the abstention doctrine was applicable
in that situation and that it had no place
asserting itself into a possible state crim-
inal trial when no federal rights were im-
mediately threatened.
Shortly thereafter, the three-judge fed-
eral court which had been convened to en-
tertain various challenges to the Missouri
law likewise dismissed the suit.42 In that
case there was no allegation that anyone
had performed an abortion or that any
prosecution was threatened. In the dismis-
sal, the panel relied upon the
• . . long-standing reluctance on the pirt
of the federal courts to exercise jurisdic-
tion over controversies involving unsettled
questions of state law where the questions
have not been decided in the state tribunal
first, even though there are underlying fed-
eral constitutional questions. 43
The panel noted a Supreme Court de-
cision which had recently reiterated this
principle. 44 While the abstention doctrine
42 Rodgers v. Danforth, - F. Supp.
(W.D. Mo. 1970).
43 Id. at -.
44 Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82 (1970). This
decision involved the review of the declaration
of a three-judge federal district court that an
Alaskan statute was unconstitutional when the
constitutional question had not been previously
considered by any state court. The Supreme
Court held that the abstention doctrine was ap-
plicable and that state courts should have the
is definitely applicable where there has
been no consideration of the matter by a
state court, it would appear to be equally
applicable in the situations where the con-
stitutionality of a statute has been con-
sidered by a state court and not found
wanting-unless, of course, there are ex-
traordinary circumstances where the dan-
ger of irreparable loss is both great and
immediate. 45
The implicit limitations which both the
Constitution and judicial precedent place
upon the interference of federal courts in
the interpretation and application of state
criminal statutes was recently emphasized
in a series of Supreme Court decisions. In
one of these cases46 a three-judge federal
court had ruled that the California Crim-
inal Syndicalism Act was void for vague-
ness and overbreadth in violation of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments; and
enjoined prosecution of the plaintiff in the
federal suit under the act. The Court said
that the judgment enjoining prosecution
must be reversed as a violation of the
national policy forbidding federal courts to
stay or enjoin pending state court proceed-
ings except under special circumstances. 47
While this statement would appear to be
especially applicable to the Babbitz deci-
sion, discussed supra, another comment of
the Court would seem to have equal ap-
opportunity to pass on whatever constitutional
questions might be involved in the enactment or
enforcement of their own state laws.
45 Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 243-244
(1926).
46 Younger v. Harris, 39 U.S.L.W. 4201 (U.S.
Feb. 23, 1971).
47 Id. at 4202.
plicability to those other federal decisions
which have held state abortion laws un-
constitutional. In most of these cases, those
seeking to have the laws declared uncon-
stitutional were doctors, women and clergy-
men. The Supreme Court noted, in
reference to those who joined Petitioner
Younger in seeking to have prosecution
enjoined under the Syndicalism Act, that
.. . persons having no fears of state pros-
ecution except those that are imaginary or
speculative, are not to be accepted as ap-
propriate plaintiffs in such cases.48
Speaking for eight members of the Court
(Justice Douglas dissented), Justice Black
thoroughly discussed the role of the federal
judiciary in the enforcement and applicabil-
ity of state statutes. He said that the
concept of "Our Federalism," as envis-
ioned by the Framers of the Constitution,
represented ". . . a sensitivity to the legit-
imate interests of both State and National
Governments . . .'49 and that this concept
explained ". . . why it has been perfectly
natural for our cases to repeat time and
time again that the normal thing to do
when federal courts are asked to enjoin
pending proceedings in state courts is not
to issue such injunctions."50 However, the
Court apparently still views the interven-
tion of three-judge district courts as legit-
imate when there is an allegation of a
48 Id. See also Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103
(1969); Doe v. Dunbar, 320 F. Supp. 1297 (D.
Colo. 1970). But see Berger, Standing to Sue in
Public Actions: Is it a Constitutional Require-
ment? 78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969).
49 39 U.S.L.W. at 4203.
50 Id. See also Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319
U.S. 157 (1943).
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bad-faith prosecution or an attempt to
harass under the color of state law as ex-
pressed in Dombrowski.51
Justice Black concluded his opinion
with the comment that "... the possible
unconstitutionality of a statute 'on its face'
does not in itself justify an injunction
against good faith attempts to enforce
it. .. ,52 Two other decisions, 53 handed
down the same day, emphasize this concept
of restraint on the part of the federal
courts; and the general applicability of
these cases to those suits challenging state
abortion statutes appears unmistakable.5 4
State Court Actions
The constitutionality of abortion laws
has also been considered by three state su-
preme courts, in addition to the California
Supreme Court in the Belous case.
In dealing with the Iowa abortion stat-
ute,55 that State's Supreme Court consid-
ered the possible vagueness of the law in
light of the Belous decision. The court
said that the statute before it was sub-
stantially similar to that under considera-
tion in the California case but ruled that
it was not persuaded by the majority of
the California court and upheld the Iowa
51 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
52 39 U.S.L.W. at 4206.
53 Boyle v. Landry, 39 U.S.L.W. 4207 (U.S.
Feb. 23, 1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 39 U.S.L.W.
4214 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1971).
54 In addition to those cases discussed herein,
challenges to state abortion statutes are currently
pending before three-judge federal courts in
Arizona, Colorado, Kentucky, New Jersey, Okla-
homa, Pennsylvania and Utah.
55 IOWA CODE, § 701.1.
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law.56 This case involved the appeal of a
person, who was not a physician, from a
criminal conviction for referring expectant
mothers to another person for abortions.
In discussing the contention that the stat-
ute effectuated a denial of equal protection
the Iowa Court examined an earlier de-
cision57 in which it had clearly established
a presumption of innocence in the case of
a physician's bona fide attempt at com-
pliance with the law. The court noted,
however, that this presumption-and its in-
herent protection--does not extend to a
person who is not a physician.
The argument that the Louisiana abor-
tion law5s is unconstitutional, on a num-
ber of grounds, was presented to that
State's Supreme Court in the appeal of a
non-physician convicted of violating the
statute. The court ruled that such argu-
ments were to be properly addressed to
the legislature and upheld the law. 59
The Vermont statute6" was also con-
sidered by that State's Supreme Court in
a petition for postconviction relief by a
non-physician, on the grounds that the
law was unconstitutionally vague.61 The
petitioner had pleaded guilty to the original
indictment of assisting in the procurement
of an abortion, and the court said that this
removed the viability of any claim of sur-
prised innocence due to vagueness. The
56 State v. Abodeely, - Iowa - , 179 N.W.
2d 347 (1970).
57 State v. Dunkelbarger, 206 Iowa 971, 221
N.W. 592 (1928).
58 LA. REv. STAT. § 14:87, et seq.
59 State v. Pesson, 256 La. 201, 235 So. 2d 568
(1970).
60 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 101.
61 State v. Bartlett, 270 A.2d 168 (1970).
Vermont Supreme Court also noted that
the petitioner was in no way situated to
enforce his claim that the law was imper-
missibly vague as applied to women gen-
erally or to doctors who must decide
whether an abortion would be allowable
under the law; and it affirmed the convic-
tion of the petitioner.
Abortion statutes have also been con-
sidered by a number of lower state courts.
Some of these have ruled the law under
examination to be unconstitutional, 62 while
others have upheld them. 63
Conclusion
There are a number of anomalies al-
ready existent in the law which are, of
course, reflections of the mores of the so-
ciety which the law mirrors. There is no
need to create further contradictions within
our jurisprudential ethic, lest more people
come to share the opinion of Mr. Bumble
that the law is indeed "a ass."
The child, en ventre sa mere, can inherit
by will and by intestacy; he can be the
beneficiary of a trust and he can be tor-
tiously injured; he can be represented by a
guardian seeking support from his parents
and he can be protected by criminal stat-
utes on parental neglect. The unborn's
parents have also been held to have a right
of action against the perpetrator of his
62 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Page (C.P. of
Centre County, Penn., #1968-353, 1970); People
v. Anast (Cir. Ct. of Cook County, Ill., #69-
3429, 1970); State v. Munson, (Cir. Ct. of the
7th Jud. Dist. of S. Dak., 1970).
63 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Brunelle, (Super.
Ct. of Middlesex County, Mass., #83879, 1970);
State v. Hodgson, (Dist. Ct. of the 2d Jud.
Dist. of Ramsey County, Minn., #23789, 1970).
wrongful death. It would be somewhat
ludicrous for the courts, in light of the
panoply of rights which statutory and de-
cisional law have conferred upon the child
in utero, to simultaneously decree that he
can be deprived of that right upon which
all others depend, except in the most
serious circumstances. 4 Should the courts
give breath to this inherent contradiction
in sanctioning abortions, except in such
circumstances, Mr. Bumble could well
prove to be more of a prophet than Dickens
had ever thought possible. *
64 See generally Archibald, The Law as a Schizo-
phrenic, 23 REs IPSA LOQUITUR 12 (1970).
* Following the preparation of this article, the
United States Supreme Court acted in two of
the cases discussed herein.
In Babbitz v. McCann, 39 U.S.L.W. -
(U.S. -. -, 1971) the Court in an 8-1 decision
with Justice Douglas dissenting, vacated the judg-
ment of a three-judge federal district court in
Wisconsin which had declared the State's abor-
tion statute unconstitutional and had enjoined
prosecution under it. In addition to the vacation,
the Court remanded the case to the three-judge
district court for further consideration in light
of the recent decisions in Younger v. Harrris,
39 U.S.L.W. 4201 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1971) and its
companion cases, which are discussed in the
body of this article,
In United States v. Vuitch, 39 U.S.L.W. 4464
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(U.S. Apr. 21, 1971) the Supreme Court up-
held the constitutionality of the District of
Columbia statute reversing the decision of Judge
Gesell, on the trial level, that the law was void
for vagueness. Four members of the Court, the
Chief Justice and Justices Harlan, White and
Blackmun concurred in the majority opinion writ-
ten by Justice Black. Justices Harlan and Black-
mun contended that the Court ought not to have
assumed jurisdiction, but said that they never-
theless concurred in the ultimate decision of the
majority; while Justices Brennan and Marshall,
also feeling that the Court ought not to have
assumed jurisdiction, refused to pass on the
merits. Justices Douglas and Stewart, while feel-
ing that the assumption of jurisdiction was proper,
disagreed with the majority in its ultimate dis-
position of the matter. The majority opinion on
the merits clearly established that it is the bur-
den of the Government to establish, in a criminal
abortion proceeding, not only that an abortion
was performed but also that its performance fell
outside the confines of the law. The majority also
concluded that the word "health" in the D.C.
statute included mental health, thus sanctioning
the performance of abortions for psychiatric rea-
sons under this law. This clearly places a burden
upon the medical profession to determine just
what psychiatric grounds, if any, do actually exist
which would warrant the destruction of unborn
children. There can be little constitutional argu-
ment with the destruction of one human life in
order to save the life of another. However, our
jurisprudential ethic has never equated human
life itself with mental health, and an examination
of this equation must be undertaken in a subse-
quent case.
